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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH ~IARIE BASINGER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
vs. 
STANDARD FURNITURE CO~f­
PANY, a corporation; ZION'S 
CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION, CASE No. 7418 
Defendants and Respondents, 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, and LOIS 
GREENWOOD, doing business as 
LOIS GREENWOOD, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The 'P·arties will be designated as follows: plaintiff 
and appellant will be referred to as appellant; defendant8 
and respondents, Standard Furniture Company, a cor-
poration, and Zion's Co-operative :Mercantile Institution, 
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will be referred to as respondents. The defendant, Zion's 
Savings Bank and Trust Company and Lois Greenwood, 
will be referred to merely as defendants. 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, on the 23rd of December, 1947 at 3:30 in 
the afternoon, was walking westward on the south side 
of South Temple Street. She was at that time accom-
panied by her four small children; three children were 
walking at her side and she carried her daughter Gloria, 
who was two years of age, in her arms. As she reached 
the west side of the driveway which enters into the 
rear of the Standard Furniture Company and Zion's 
Co-operative Mercantile Institution from South Temple 
Street she looked into the driveway and onto the street 
and then crossed over the driveway. As she reached 
the west side she caught her foot on a 'perpendicular 
ledge at the western edge of the driveway to the rear 
of the aforementioned business houses. At the point 
appellant caught her foot the driveway was about one 
and one-half inches lower than the City sidewalk im-
mediately to the west. Mrs. Basinger fell forward 
heavily and as she fell she threw her daughter ahead 
of her so as not to fall on her and caught the full weight 
of her fall on her arms, shoulders and hands. Appellant 
suffered severe injuries to the muscles, ligaments and 
soft tissues of her shoulders, arms, back and neck. Ever 
since the accident appellant has suffered continuous dis-
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ability. The disability wa8 total for some time after 
her injuries and had progressively decreased to the 
time of trial, but eYen then she could not accomplish 
the usual and ordinary \York of taking- care of her family 
and her house,York. 
The case came on for trial on the 30th of J nne, 
1949 before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. At the close 
of appellant's ease all of the defendants made motion~ 
for nonsuit. The motions on part of each and every 
defendant were granted. The grounds for said rule was 
different as to the defendants, Zion's Savings Bank and 
Trust Company and Lois Greenwood. As to those de-
fendants the basis of the court's ruling was that the 
evidence did not show that either the bank or Lois 
Greenwood ever used the driveway from South Temple 
Street into the rear of the Standard Furniture Company 
and Zion's :Mercantile Institution. From those rulings 
the appellant does not appeal. The Court, however, 
nonsuited plaintiff as to the defendants who are re-
spondents in this action on different grounds, and fron1 
his ruling this appeal is prosecuted. 
The evidence demonstrated conclusively and without 
any conflict that there was a definite perpendicular ledge 
at the point where appellant fell which extended several 
feet along the western side of the driveway into the 
rear of Standard Furniture and Zion's Co-operative 
:Mercantile Institution. Photographs of the ledge were 
introduced in evidence as exhibits. The photographs 
show the ledge as it appeared on the day that appellant 
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fell. They also show that the point where appellant 
fell was a low point in the driveway. These exhibits 
are marked as Exhibit ''A'', '' B' ', and '' 1' '. 
The manager of the z.c.M:.I. Tea Room, Sibyl 
Watts, testified that the mercantile institute received 
deliveries from delivery trucks through the Standard 
Furniture driveway and such deliveries averaged five 
or six a day. The trash and garbage was also removed 
from the back door of the tea room through the driveway, 
and that this use by Z.C.M.I. had continued for at least 
nine years to the witness's own knowledge. (R. 170-1-2). 
Witness Smith testified that he had observed the 
respondent, Standard Furniture Com1pany, using the 
driveway into the rear of their store for fifteen or twenty 
years and that he had also seen Sunfreeze delivery 
wagons go through the driveway to Z.C.M.I. (R. 200). 
He also testified that the vehicles he observed going 
into Standard Furniture Company were big furniture 
van trucks. (R. 201). 
Witness Armstrong, manager of Standard Furniture 
Company, testified that the Standard Furniture Com-
pany had been in operation since November 9, 1909 and 
that ever since that time they had used the driveway 
and that their trucks and several other trucks not be-
longing to them had used it. At the time of trial the 
Standard Furniture Company had six trucks, two of 
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which were eab-nYer Yan~ of a ton and a half dt>::-;ignated 
tonnage. Armstrong te~tified further that the use had 
been constant oYer the twent:· year~ of his as::-;ociation 
with Standard Furniture, the exact use depending- on 
the amount of busines~ transacted and tlw nmnber of 
trucks which the Standard Furniture Company ownetl 
(R. ~03-6). It was Armstrong's judgment that there 
would be fifty different trucks using the drive·way serY-
ing the respondent Z.CJ\tl. 's Tea Room and the Stand-
ard Furniture Company business. Armstrong also testi-
fied on cross-examination by :Mr. Christensen, counsel 
for Standard Furniture Company, that the low point 
in the driveway had existed for as many years as he 
could remember and that as far as he knew during the 
twenty years of his association with Standard Furniture 
Company the driveway appeared as it is shown in 
Exhibit "A" (R. 211, 212). He further testified that 
Standard Furniture Company had made no effort what-
soever to correct the condition in the driveway. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. That there was sufficient substantial evidence 
from \vhich a jury could find the respondents were both 
negligent and that their negligence was the proximate 
cause of appellant's injury and therefore the orders of 
the court granting respondents' motions for nonsuit 
were erroneous, depriving appellant of her right to a 
jury trial. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGU~fENT 
POINT I. 
THERE I:S SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT RE-
SPONDENTS PUT THE SIDEWALK TO AN UNUSUAL AND 
EXTRAORDINARY USE WHICH CAUSED THE DEFECT 
FROM WHICH APPELLANT RE·CEIVED HER INJURIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT RE-
SPONDENTS PUT THE SIDEWALK TO AN UNUSUAL AND 
EXTRAORDINARY USE WHICH CAUSED THE DEFECT 
FROM WHICH APPELLANT RECEIVED HER INJURIES. 
The Exhibits A, B, and 1, show that the poin.t 
where the driveway was sunk below the adjoining side-
walk was a short portion of the driveway. They show 
that the cement block which was in the driveway was 
cracked and broken in an easterly-westerly direction. 
The pictures also show that the southernmost edge of 
the driveway and sidewalk are level with one another. 
From this evidence the jury might well find that the 
extraordinary use which had been imposed on the side-
walk by the res'Pondents was the cause of the breaking 
of the . cement blocks and the ledge along the western 
edge of the driveway. The pictures themselves might 
well be the basis for an inference that some extra-
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ordinarily heayy use other than pedestrian and ordinary 
foot traYel on the sidewalk caused thP breaking of the 
cement slab in the driYeway and the lowering of the 
driveway below the edge of the sidewalk to the west 
and in this way created the ledge which caused appellant 
to suffer her fall and injuries. The law of unusual and 
extraordinary uses of public sidewalks "·as thoroughly 
discussed by this court in the case of Salt Lake City v. 
William Schnbach, et al., 108 Utah 266, 159 P. 2d 149, 
160 A.L.R. 809, 815, 819. There this court held that 
the person who put a public sidewalk to an extraordinary 
use is responsible for the maintenance, repair and upkeep 
of the sidewalk at the plaee where his unusual and extra-
ordinary use occurs. The Schubach case places the 
liability for injuries to users of the sidewalk on the 
party negligent who creates or maintains a dangerous 
situation and whose failure to maintain the thing he 
has used for his own benefit or purpos~ causes the 
accident. The evidence in the ;present case clearly shows 
that both Standard Furniture Company and Z.C.~LI. 
put the public sidewalk to an extraordinary and unusual 
use, and the evidence is without conflict that the defect 
in the sidewalk had existed for a long time and that 
no attempt to repair or alleviate the defect had been 
made by either respondent. 
The question of whether or not a defect is such a8 
would constitute a dangerous and unsafe condition in the 
sidewalk is a question of fact which must be determined 
by a jury. In the case of Ray v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 
412, 69 P. 2d 256, 119 A.L.R. 153, the actual differences 
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in elevations of adjoining sections of sidewalks ·was from 
three-quarters to seven-eighths of an inch on the north 
side and one-quarter to three-eighths of an inch on the 
south side. The Utah Court held that this elevation 
was sufficient to make a jury question of whether or 
not this elevation constituted a danger. The court stated 
its position in the following discussion: 
'' * * * This court in discussing the rna tter in 
the case of Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah, 
320, 159 P. 530, 533, refused to follow what 
was then recognized as the numerical weight of 
authority, and followed what appears to be the 
only course that could be followed. It was there 
said: 'This court is firmly committed to the 
doctrine that ordinarily the question of whether 
the maintenance of a particular defect in a 
street or sidewalk constitutes negligence on the 
part of the municipality is a question of fact 
for the jury.' 
"The following cases are cited: Jones v. 
Ogden City, 32 Utah, 221, 89 P. 1006; Bills v. 
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah, 507, 109 P. 745; Robinson 
v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah, 497, 121 P. 968; Sweet 
v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah, 306, 134 P. 1167." 
The Salt Lake City v .. Schubach case, supra, sets 
forth the general principles applicable to the case at 
bar. There the owner of the abutting property con-
structed in the sidewalk an entrance to his basement, 
the entrance being covered by iron or steel doors. The 
steel doors became out of repair and a pedestrian was 
injured. The pedestrian sued Salt Lake City, recovered 
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judgment ag·ain~t it and ~alt Lake Cit~· brought thP 
aetion here disen~sPd again~t the tenant and abutting 
o"·ner of the 'property for who~p rouYenielH'P the en-
trance way was constructed. Thi~ eourt held that the 
owner of the land ''"a~ liable to the City for the amount 
of recovery by the pedestrian and statPd tlw applicabh· 
principles in the following language: 
''The ultimate liability i~ upon the author or 
continuer of the nuisance. 'Vhen the owner in-
stalls such passageways, vaults or coal holes, it 
is presumably done for the benefit of his prop-
erty. 'Neither the public or other individuah; 
can derive any possible advantage frmn such a 
use of the sidewalk, but it is solely for the de-
fendant's benefit, and he must see to it that he 
does not endanger the safety of others, and that 
he incommodes the public as little as possible.' '' 
The general principle set down was that any person 
who makes use of the public sidewalk for his own bene-
fits, using it in an unusual or extraordinary manner, 
must exercise care that pedestrians are not endangered 
by the extraordinary use made of the sidewalk. The 
court set forth the principles succinctly in the following 
language: 
" * * * Clearly enough, as to the person in-
jured the liability rests upon the party negligent, 
the party who creates, or maintains a dangerous 
situation, whose failure to maintain the thing he 
is using for his own benefit or purpose causes 
the accident.'' 
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Many cases on facts similar to the Salt Lake City v. 
Schubach, supra, case have been decided where entrance 
ways, skylights and other unusual uses have been made 
of public sidewalks to benefit the adjacent property 
owners. A leading case in California on the matter is 
M onsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 790, 204 P. 224. There the 
use made of the sidewalk was for the purpose of supply-
ing light to defendant's basement. The skylight was 
allowed to get broken and out of repair. The California 
court applied the principles set forth in Salt Lake City 
v. Schubach, supra, and arrived at the conclusion that 
the person suffering injuries as a result of the failure 
of the owner of the abutting property was entitled to 
recover against the abutter. A later California case 
applying the same reasoning to a use by an abutting 
owner of the sidewalk for a driveway is Granucci v. 
Claasen, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437, 59 A.L.R. 435, 43H. 
The abutting owner constructed a driveway out of 
planks superimposed on the sidewalk in front of his 
premises. A spike in one of the vlanks became loose 
and plaintiff stumbled on the spike and suffered personal 
injuries. The California court citing M onsch v. Pellissier, 
supra, as authority held that the use of the sidewalk 
for a driveway was an unusual and extraordinary use 
and stated the duties imposed on the user in the follow-
ing language : 
"This driveway having been thus constructed 
and used not 1p.rimarily for sidewalk purposes 
but for the benefit and convenience of the said 
defendants in connection with their adjacent 
property, and which use was one which was 
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independent of and apart from the ordinary and 
accustomed use for which sidewalks are designed, 
the duty was cast by law upon the defendants to 
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the 
keeping of said driveway at the point where it 
was superimposed upon said sidewalk in a 
proper and safe condition for the passage of 
pedestrians rightfully using said sidewalk and 
said driveway superimposed by defendants there-
on. ~Ionsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 792, 204 Pac. 
224; Du Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal. 
App. 383, 187 Pac. 767; 20 R. C. L. p. 77, Sec. 
68; 13 R. C. L. p. 320; Grand Forks v. Paulsness, 
19 N. D. 293, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1158, 123 N. W. 
878; Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 34 L.R.A. 
557, 54 Am. St. Rep. 623, 64 N. W. 94; Mullen 
v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15 Am. Rep. 530; Gray 
v. Boston Gaslight Co. 114 Mass. 149, 19 Am. Rep. 
324. The duty which was thus cast upon the 
defendant Mary J. Claasen, as owner of said 
premises, continued during the entire period of 
the presence and use of said driveway in connec-
tion therewith and said defendant could not re-
lieve herself of such duty either by leasing the 
same to her codefendant or by contracting with 
him by the terms of said lease for the keeping 
of said premises and said driveway in a proper 
state of repair." 
The uses to which the defendants had put the public 
sidewalk were almost the same use to which respondents 
had put the sidewalk to in the present case. The court 
describing the use stated as follows: 
''From the evidence as thus far presented it 
appears conclusively, for the p~rposes o.f this 
appeal, that the said driveway at the point where 
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the plaint~_ff tripped and fell upon it was in a 
state of disrepair, which, if imputable to the 
negligence of said defendants, would suffice to 
entitle this plaintiff to maintain her action. ThP 
undisputed evidence disclosed that said driveway 
during the ten years of its existence, with the 
exception of a brief intermission, had been used 
and passed over daily by more or less heay~· 
trucks and horsedrawn vehicles in connection 
with the use of said premises as a brewery and 
later as a coffee mill. During that entire period, 
according to the testimony both of the owner of 
said premises and of her son, the lessee thereof, 
the driveway had never been subjected to any 
sort of repair." 
The California court treated the use of the sidewalk as 
a driveway into the premises of the abutting owner 
in exactly the same ·way as it treated the use of 
the sidewalk for a light well and other similar uses 
made by abutting owners of public sidewalks, and saw 
no difference between the different types of uses. Cer-
tainly all of the uses are unusual and extraordinary uses 
of the public sidewalk. In Gramteci v. Claasen, supr3, 
the court stated: 
'' * " * since the portion of said sidewalk upon 
which the defendants' driveway was superimposed 
was being used by said defendants, not as a side-
walk nor primarily for the use and convenience 
of the general public, but that the same had been 
constructed and was being used by the defend-
ants primarily as a driveway into their said 
premises and for their private use, convenience 
and benefit. To such a state of facts the decision 
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of this court in the case of M:onsch v. Pellissier, 
supra, has direct application.'' 
.A!ppellant has discovered a number of cases cover-
ing unusual uses of public sidewalks and has been 
unable to find any case where it has not been held that 
the person putting the sidewalk to an unusual use is 
charged with the responsibility for injuries incurred 
when the use renders the sidewalk dangerous and unsafe 
for pedestrian travel. There are a number of cases 
which hold that using the public sidewalk as a driveway 
is an unusual and extraordinary use. These case·s hold 
that the active negligence of the user of the public 
sidewalk is the basis upon which recovery should be 
based by the pedestrian suffering injury. A case setting 
forth the basic principle of law covering this is Davis v. 
Tallon, et al., 96 N.J.L. 618, 103 Atl. 236, 237. The court 
stated the principles upon which the user of the side-
walk was held liable to a pedestrian for injuries created 
by the use of the sidewalk in unmistakable language: 
" * * * The plaintiff's case was not rested 
upon any legal obligation of the owner to keep 
the sidewalk in repair, but upon the claim that 
defendants, by subjecting the sidewalk to a use 
· not intended, that of use by ordinary 1pedestrians, 
created a nuisance which rendered them liable 
for injuries to persons lawfully using it. The 
case was submitted to the jury on this theory, 
who found for the plaintiff against the owners, 
and awarded her $100, and in favor of the de-
fendant Schreiber." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
the court holding that the broken condition of the flag-
stones of the sidewalk ·where the defendant had used it 
for egress and ingress to its premises would give raise 
to an inference that the defect was caused by such use, 
stated: 
'' • * * With the broken condition of the 
flagstones existing, subject to the inference that 
the condition was caused by using the sidewalk 
for the passage of heavy carts from the street 
to the lot by prior tenants with the knowledge 
and implied participation therein by the owners, 
and the testimony of the defendant Schreiber that 
the flagstones were not broken by him, the jury 
might infer that the nuisance was created by 
the act of former tenants, and not by Schreiber, 
but his exoneration would not discharge the 
owners from liability for the acts of their other 
tenants in which they participated. Three causes 
of action are set out in the complaint: First 
that the owners negligently used the sidewalk 
so that it became dangerous, by which neglect 
the plaintiff was injured; and second, that the 
owners, for their own convenience and that of 
their lessees, created and maintained this danger-
ous condition. On one or the other of these 
causes the jury found, as they properly might, 
against the owners.'' 
Zak v .. Craig, 5 N.J. Misc. R. 275, 136 Atl. 410, 411, 
is a later New Jersey case applying the principles of 
the Davis case to use by trucks. The ingress and egress 
there was into a garage which opened upon the public 
highway. The defendant argued that there was no legal 
duty on the part of the defendant to keep and repair 
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the sidewalk and that the defendant wa~ not responsible 
for the acts of tenants on her property. The court 
affirming a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum 
of $3,000.00 stated the theory of liability as follows: 
·'The theory upon which the liability of the 
defendant was submitted to the jury was the 
maintenance of a nuisance in the public highway. 
There was 'Plenary proof that the sidewalk did 
not become defective and unsafe from the ordi-
nary use thereof by the general public, but it 
became broken up as the result of a use for ,,~hich 
it was not normally designed, namely, the passage 
of heavy motor trucks over it to and from the 
defendant's garage, leased to tenants, for the 
storing of motor trucks, and in which use the 
flagstones were broken, and a hole seven inches 
in diameter and six inches in depth was made 
in the sidewalk, making it unsafe and dangerous 
to the public having occasion to use it. The con-
dition of the sidewalk constituted a public nui-
sance. The only question in the case was whether 
there was any evidence tending to establish that 
the defendant caused or maintained the nuisance.'' 
Further enlarging upon the inferences that could be 
drawn from the fact of dam~ge to the sidewalk at the 
point where the extraordinary use was imposed upon 
it, the court stated what we consider to be an applicable 
rprinci ple : 
''There was also testimony in the case which 
tended to show that, at the time of the expiration 
of the lease to the grocery company and the re-
newal thereof to it, such renewal impliedly aris-
ing from the fact that the defendant permitted 
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the grocery company to remain as tenant, the 
hole in the sidewalk existed and the flagstones 
were broken, and hence, as this condition consti-
tuted a nuisance, and did not have its origin 
from the ordinary wear and tear of a sidewalk, 
resulting from a normal use by the public, but, 
according to the testimony, was created by the 
extraordinary strain put upon the sidewalk by 
the tenants of the defendant, who were author-
ized by her to use the premises for a purpose 
which caused the sidewalk to be subjected to 
unusual pressure and strain, and for which use 
the sidewalk was not designed, that is, for motor 
trucks or other heavy vehicles to be driven over 
it, the defendant became answerable to respond 
to the plaintiff in damages for the injuries she 
sustained. 
''The motions for a nonsuit and for the direc-
tion of a verdict for the defendant were properly 
refused.'' 
Other jurisdictions having passed upon the same 
proposition have reached like conclusions. An important 
case directly in point in the present suit is Mullins v. 
Siegel-Cooper Co., 95 App. Div. 234, 88 N.Y. Supp. 737, 
739, affirmed 183 N.Y. 129, 75 N.E. 1112. There the 
defendant crossed over the sidewalk into a lane leading 
to his place of business. The cross-over on the sidewalk 
was used by wagons hauling loads of stones and building 
materials into defendant's property and ,,·as also used 
by wagons hauling manure out of the defendant's stables, 
the use creating a defect in the side·walk upon which 
plaintiff stumbled and suffered her injuries. The New 
York courts, a'pplying the principles that the person 
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creating a defect in the sidewalk by his unusual aud 
extraordinary use thereof will be held responsible for 
reasonable eare to ~t>e that the ~ide\\·alk i~ not rendered 
unsafe or dangerous, held the defendant liable to the 
plaintiff for the injuries which ::;he receiYed when she 
fell. They also went on to set dm:vn a principle which 
the California courts in the Granucci case, supra, applied, 
namely, that there is no difference between the use of 
the public sidewalks for grates, coal chutes, etc., and a 
use of the side·walk for a driYe\vay, stating: 
'' \Y e discover no difference in principle be-
tween this case and those dealing vYith grates, 
coal chutes, or holes in sidewalks. Such openings 
in the sidewalk are put there for the advantage 
of the owners, and for the benefit of the property. 
In the case at bar the stone was drawn in upon 
the premises of defendant for the purpose of 
building a wall to enhance the value of the prop-
erty, and for the use and convenience of the 
defendant. It subjected the sidewalk in front of 
this lane to a use other than that involved in the 
right of the public to use the sidewalk, and was 
purely its own. No question arises that such 
use was unauthorized, for one may have access 
from his premises to the public street, even 
though he must cross the sidewalk; but under 
the doctrine we have cited, and under the maxim, 
'So use your own property as not to injure the 
rights of another,' we believe that, as the injury 
to the walk was primarily caused by the drawing 
of the stone, and was enhanced by subsequent 
private use of the defendant, or for its benefit, 
it was liable for the result of the improper condi-
tion. The accident occurred several months after 
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the sidewalk was first put into this unsafe condi-
tion, which grew steadily worse.'' 
See also: City of Topeka v. Cent-ral Sash & Door Co., 97 
Kan. 49, 154 P. 232. 
None of the cases above cited have been particularly 
concerned ·with a statute but, of cour~e, statutory lan-
guage fixing liabilities and duties of users of the public 
sidewalks would be helpful. 
Section 36-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, sets forth 
the general duties of persons who encroach upon the 
sidewalks. The section reads as follows: 
"SIDEWALKS-Encroachments by or on-
Porches, Flumes, Pvpes. It shall be unlawful to 
extend or construct any sidewalk so as to encroach 
upon any highway nearer to the center thereof 
than the curb line, or to encroach upon any side-
walk with any building, fence, wall, post or other 
thing nearer than the fence line, or so as to make 
the sidewalk narrower than the widths herein 
designated; and all platforms, porches or other 
similar things on sidewalks shall be at the grade 
thereof, and flumes, pipes or other similar things 
below the grade shall be covered to grade, and 
shall be kep.t in good repair by the person in 
whose interest constructed so as not to be danger-
ous to pedestrians or to impair the safe and 
ordinary use of the highway.'' 
While the above quoted statute does not specifically 
mention roadways or driveways over the sidewalk it 
sets down a general principle which would be a·pplicable 
to such encroachments. 
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From the quoted eases and the statutory law of 
Utah it appears that respondents who were making an 
extraordinary use of the sidewalk in front of the Stand-
ard Furniture driveway incurred a duty to keep in 
repair the sidewalk at that point. This duty they failed 
to perfonn and as a result appellant suffered injuries. 
On every factual matter there was substantial evidence 
from which a jury could have resolved all the issues in 
appellant's favor, and the court erred in nonsuiting 
plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 'H 
order nonsuiting appellant as against respondents, 
Standard Furniture Company and Zion's Co-operative 
l\fercantile Institution, was erroneous and contrary to 
law, there being substantial evidence on all issues pre-
sented and if said order is allowed to stand it will deprive 
plaintiff of her right to a jury trial; that said order 
should be set aside and appellant granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING and 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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